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John D. Leshy
I. INTRODUCTION
A more conservative judiciary interacting with more complex and 
disputatious agency responsibilities leads to the conclusion that 
more attention must be paid by federal natural resource agencies.
What follows is a view from the trenches, as a Department of the 
Interior retread, rather than from my previous perch in academia. 
The usual disclaimer about not speaking for the agency applies - 
these are musings, not policy. (Some of the examples and ideas 
that follow are found in Coggins, Wilkinson and Leshy, Federal 
Public Land and Resources LLaw (3d. ed. 1993), e.g., at pp. 227- 
251, 506-510, 570-80, 610-21, 694-702.)
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCIES - AN 
OVERVIEW
A. The Department of the Interior plays an array of roles in 
natural resources - as developer, as permittee of development, as 
regulator of public or private development, as trustee for tribes. 
Each role potentially implicates takings, but context can be 
crucial. I want to confine myself here basically to the role the 
Department plays as owner/manager of federal natural resources 
under its jurisdiction; timber, minerals, water, etc.
B. Although state law usually determines the parameters of 
property interests subject to Fifth Amendment protection, whatever 
private property interests exist in these federal natural resources 
are nearly always created in the first instance by federal law, 
contract, regulation, or some combination. (For an exception, 
consider the important, if murky, role state law plays in 
determining property interests conveyed in a federal contract to 
deliver water from a federal reclamation project.)
C. Some generic questions are implicated here; for example:
—  Should property interests in natural resources be treated
differently from other property interests? Cf. John Muir 
("Everything is hitched to everything else"); Sax, "Property 
Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v .
South Carolina Coastal Council." 45 Stanford L. Rev. 1433 
(1993).
—  Is there any case to be made for treating federally-owned 
natural resources differently? Is it significant that in 
mandating multiple use/sustained yield management on hundreds 
of millions of acres of federal land, Congress has recognized
the interaction of various uses and made sustainability a 
paramount management goal.
—  Apart from the specific terms of a statute or a lease or 
permit, what expectations may an owner of a property interest 
in a federal natural resource legitimately have? Cf. United 
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) ("The United States, as 
owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain, 
maintains broad powers over the terms and conditions upon 
which the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired. ... 
Claimants thus take their ... interests with the knowledge 
that the Government retains substantial regulatory power over 
... [them].")
III. THE ROLES OF THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS IN CREATING AND 
DEFINING PROPERTY INTERESTS IN FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCES.
A. Sometimes Congress makes the matter clear; e.g., it has 
forbidden the Executive from creating a property interest in a 
grazing permit, see 43 U.S.C. 315b, although the matter continues 
to be debated in the political arena.
B. Sometimes Congress creates a fairly elaborate scheme for 
balancing property interests against governmental regulatory power. 
It has, for example, authorized the government to extinguish an 
opportunity to develop oil and gas resources on the Outer 
Continental Shelf previously allowed, and defined the measure of 
compensation in such circumstances with some specificity. OCS 
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1334.
C. Sometimes Congress seems to cotemplate that some property 
interest will be conveyed by a legal instrument like a mineral 
lease, or the filing of a mining claim, but leaves up to the 
executive and the courts to figure out just what that interest is, 
and when it vests.
D. Sometimes Congress leaves the Executive with very broad power 
to determine what kind of property interest, if any, to convey in 
federal natural resources? e.g., FLPMA Title V right-of-way permit.
IV. HOW SHOULD THE EXECUTIVE EXERCISE ITS AUTHORITY TO DEFINE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCES?
A. Subject to the variations and limitations already mentioned, 
there are, as a general matter, many circumstances in which the 
federal natural resources agencies currently have the legal 
authority to include, by regulation or as a term of a permit, 
contract or lease, what might be called an "environmental 
contingency" to help withstand takings challenges. This clause 
would, in effect, seek to preserve the agency's authority to
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restrict or stop activities it previously authorized to develop 
those resources; e.g., oil production, coal mining, timber 
harvesting, or the use of water for such things as hydropower 
generation and agricultural irrigation. It seeks to more 
specifically define what legitimate, legally-recognized 
expectations are, and who bears the risk of what. In short, it 
seeks effectively to limit the property interests being conveyed, 
and by so doing defeat or at least substantially undercut takings 
claims.
B. There are a number of examples of such clauses in use - whether 
initially in statute, or found only in regulations. See, e.g., OCS 
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1334; Forest Service timber harvesting 
regulation, 36 C.F.R. 223.116(a)(5). The idea goes quite a ways 
back; see the Federal Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. 807.
C. Yet the natural resource agencies are not, in general, 
exercising this power nearly to the extent they could. Should 
they? What are the costs, and what are the benefits, to more 
widespread use of this approach in the current climate of "takings" 
sensitivities?
1. Political costs - it's better to leave matters vague and 
uncertain than to create controversy by trying to clarify 
them. Cf. the Forest Service's experience with its 
"contingent rights" stipulation in oil and gas leasing. Here 
the time lag (often many years) between the decision that may 
create a "taking" and the ultimate determination of whether a 
taking has occurred is especially influential. Also important 
here is the question of who pays within the executive branch - 
the program agency making the decision, or someone else? 
(Usually the answer is someone else; namely, the Judgment 
Fund, see 31 U.S.C. 1304.)
2. Economic costs - Leshy's paradox: The federal treasury 
may in some circumstances suffer more from winning a takings 
case than losing it. How does an "environmental contingency" 
announced up front affect bidding behavior, in those 
circumstances in which federal natural rsources are subject to 
auction? Consider also here the developers' need for 
"certainty" - often genuine but often magnified; e.g., the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System; the American Barrick patent 
under the Mining Law.
3. Decisionmaking costs - is an environmental contingency 
merely an inducement to sloppy upfront decisionmaking by the 
federal agency? Can realistic forecasts be made about the 
likelihood of environmental harm in any event? Is too much 
demanded of NEPA in some contexts? In the oil and gas 
context, for example, it may take several decades to move from 
planning through leasing, exploration, and development. 
Trying to determine before leases are issued what
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environmental consequences are "reasonably foreseeable" is a 
challenge, to say the least. See generally Land Use Planning 
and Oil and Gas Leasing on Onshore Federal Lands (National 
Academy Press, 1989), pp. 116-17.
D. Is there a way to design an "environmental contingency" 
stipulation that maximizes the benefits and minimizes these costs? 
Consider the OCS model, which limits the circumstances under which 
the reserved authority may be exercised, and defines a measure of 
compensation (the lesser of sunk costs or market value).
1. On the circumstances-limiting side, should such a 
contingency be limited to unforeseen environmental harm? 
Unforeseeable environmental harm? Cataclysmic harm? Major 
harm? If the government blew it in its NEPA analysis, who 
should pay, the developer or the Treasury? If we say the 
latter, are we encouraging the developer (who often 
participates heavily in the NEPA phase) to put its head in the 
sand?
2. On the defining-compensation side, how feasible are 
devices like bidding credits on future sales, or royalty 
credits on other leases? Exchanges of property interests for 
like interests elsewhere? Cf. Whitney Benefits. Inc, v. 
United States. 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and the use of 
"transferable development rights" now fairly common in zoning. 
A conventional answer is "great in theory, but nearly 
unworkable in practice," but is that because not enough effort 
has been made?
3. Should the agencies address the matter by generic 
regulation, by standard lease term, on a case-by-case basis, 
or in bargaining over individual leases or contracts? 
(Agencies vary considerably in how they approach such matters 
- some emphasize regulations; others have relatively few 
regulations or standard terms, and operate much more through 
negotiation with recipients.) Should the natural resources 
agencies try for a common approach (or should the White House 
address the issue in an Executive Order)? Or is "local 
control," variation and experimentation desirable?
E. In general, should compensation arising from a regulatory 
takings decision by an agency come, in whole or in part, from the 
agency's budget?
F. Consider the following variant on the defining-compensation 
issue: Should federal natural resource agencies adopt "variance" 
clauses giving them the right to choose to allow development to go 
ahead when the costs of effectively buying out property interests 
are deemed too high? Such clauses are nearly universal in zoning, 
and do appear in some contexts in some environmental regulatory 
statutes; e.g., the Clean Water Act. But they have generally been
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resisted by environmental groups, on the ground that no exemption 
or waiver from an environmental standard is ever appropriate, or is 
too subject to abuse. Can such a waiver clause be designed to 
minimize opportunities for abuse?
G. If the executive agencies do become more aggressive in the use 
of "environmental contingency" stipulations, will the courts apply 
them? See, e.g., U.S. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.. 311 U.S. 
377 (1940).
V. CONCLUSION - IS MUDDLING THROUGH INEVITABLE?
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